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EMERGING TRENDS IN EXTERNAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT
BY
BEN C. NNADI*
lNTRODUCTION

1.I
H
-L-l

xternal Reserve lt/anagement is one the statutory ob-

ligations of Central Banks

world over. The level of external reserve of a country alongside its
ability to manage it, is a fundamental indicator of the country's credit
worthiness and reputation among
the committee of nations.
This paper intends to identify
some of the main trends in central

Banks reserve management in
recent years. lt describes some
significant changes, which have
taken place, with regard to the
objectives and investment policies
of central banks, while pointing out

some elements that

Consequently, risk analysis and
performance measurement have
also become themes as central
banks seek to achieve a broader
range of objectives than before.
ln addition, the use of external
fund managers is widely gaining
popularity among central banks as
a key part of their reserves
management operations. External
managers serve several purposes:
They can contribute to a central
bank's overall return objectives and
serve as an external benchmark to
compare performance of in-house
management. Central banks also
place
great emphasis on

a

developing their own investment

noticeably slow or even reverse the

techniques and often look to
external managers as a source of

trends identified.

innovation and training.

could

ln recent years, there has
been a major trend amongst
central banks towards actively
managing foreign exchange
reserves. lnstitutions that in the
past had been content to invest
passively in market instruments
have increasingly embraced an
approach in which returns are
explicitly considered an objective
of reserve management. This shift
has occurred as central banks
have realized that their traditional
emphasis on maintaining the
liquidity of the foreign exchange
reserves need not be achieved at
the expense of other investment
objectives.
Centralbanks have also began
to pay greater attention to the
nature of the risks which they run

as part of their

reserves

management activities. There is a
growing realization that holding
foreign currency assets entails
taking on market risk which is
better managed than ignored.
*

lnvestment

in gold as

a

component of external reserves
management has also become
attractive to some central banks.
Gold trading is a vehicle by which
governments can borrow funds at
more attractive rates than outright
borrowing of funds over the
counter; gold trades below LIBOR,
over the counter lending rates are
usually at LIBOR plus (LIBOR+).
Admittedly, these recent
developments in central bank
reserve management have been
largely prompted by the dramatic
changes that have taken place in
the external environment including
the globalization of money markets
as well as the impressive advances
made in information technology. lt
is however also the result of
profound changes which have
taken place within central banks
themselves, whether arising from
increased accountability for their
actions demanded by the public, or
by the process towards greater

autonomy, or the re-engineering of

the work process, or the very
significant improvement in
communication between central
bankers themselves.
ln many cases, it will be a
combination of some or all these
factors.
SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES
IN RESERVE MANAGEMENT

(a) INCREASE lN TRANSPARENCY

Reserve management has for

a long time been considered as
one of the most confidential
activities of central banks, partly
because of its links to foreign
exchange intervention and also
because of the central banks' own
tradition of secrecy. This
confidentiality with regard to
reserve management is still
predominant among central banks.

Nevertheless, some changes are
emerging. Statutory regulations
now require more transparency
from commercial institutions in the
presentation of their published
accounts. Similarly, Treasuries and
Governments increasingly require

detailed and

greater independence, central
banks could in future be subject to
demands for more transparency,
as their accountabilities become
more precisely identified. ln
emerging market economies such
transparency may to some extent
be imposed by the market that will
require more information before
committing substantial funding to

a country.
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sophisticated

information from central banks on
the management and performance
of national reserves. As a price for
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(b) CHANGES rN THE
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DEFTNT-

TION, OBJECTIVES AND CON.
STRAINTS OF RESERVE MANAGEMENT POLICY
The security objective remains
paramount to central bank reserve
managers. Central banks are very
averse to credit risk, i.e. exposure
to losses through the default of a
bank that has received a deposit
from the central bank, or of the

markets, but to a much lesser

management:
lVlany central banks have split
their reserves between liquidity and
investment portfolios in order to deal
with different sets of objectives and

constraints. Liquidity portfolios
usually have a very short-term
management horizon and duration.

The low but effectively nskless
return achieved on this portfolio is
then viewed as the price to pay for

issuer of a security held by the

liquidity.

central bank. Even if the losses are

Central banks have also defined
liquidity risk as the risk that money

eventually recouped through
litigation, most central banks do not
want the risk of having their names
even mentioned in this connection
on the grounds of reputation risk

cannot be recovered quickly, or
recovered only at considerable

and cost.
The sensitrvity of central banks
to credit risk is such that there is a
clear trend to develop credit risk
groups charged with the independent assessment of counter parties and even sometimes, of sovereign entities, with a view to setting limits for transactions. For this
credit risk function, central banks
are drawing not only on their own
analytical capacity but also, like the
market, are using the services of
major rating agencies.
Liquidity has also remained a

linked to the depth of the market
and its capacity to absorb large
trades. Apparently, globalization of
financial markets and the extension
of hedging possibilities have
enhanced the liquidity of most
markets.
Another approach is to view
liquidity risk as arising from funding
mismatches in cash flows. ln other
words, to bear liquidity risk is to run
the risk of not being able to meet
cash needs or to run the risk of not
having funds readily available when
required. As compared to the
traditional approach, this alternative
considers that cash needs can be
met not only by liquidating assets
but also through borrowing outright
or against collateral.
However, liquidity in the sense
of financing capacities still remains
a relative concept as the conditions
under which funds can be borrowed
vary significantly from one debtor
to another. Each central bank has
to assess its own trade-off between
borrowing securities that can be
liquidated, and its borrowing costs.
More globally, it seems that
liquidity management has become
much easier for countries enjoying
a high quality rating and well
regarded by financial markets.
Others have also benefited from
overall increase in the liquidity of

major requirement for central
banks and they have noticeably
improved and refined their liquidity

management. Of course liquidity
remains difficult to grasp and to
quantify, as there is no precise
economic model to analyse it.
Liquidity is relative and often very
dependent on market conditions
and the liquidity premium can
usually not be easily isolated from
the market or the credit risk premia.
For central banks, liquidity has
another dimension, which is the
necessity not to unsettle markets

and financial disturbances that
could conflict with their other policy
objectives.
There have, however, been
several changes to the approach

of central banks to

liquidity

cost. The ability to sell or to liquidate
positions is obviously relative and
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extent.

The most noticeable changes

as regards central bank reserve
management objectives are the
increasing weight placed on
return. Return maximization while
still a "tertiary" objective is playing

a steadily increasing role in

reserve management. The main
reasons for the new crave for
return maximization include the
following:

I ln many countries there
isincreasing pressure from

governments to maximize income
from reserves in order to benefit
government finances or to service

external debt.
I High returns are necessary to
justify and finance the evergrowing investments on human
capital, office paraphernalia and
information technology.
I High returns are required as
evidence of the professionalism of
the staff and of the reputation for
efficiency of the central bank.
Although it may not be right to
generalize, it seems that the
emphasis on return is often linked
to the size of the reserves; the
higher the level of reserves, the
more weight attached to achieving
a higher return. This is consistent
with the idea that central banks
seek first to meet their transaction
and intervention needs, following
which they can then turn to the
goal of maximizing the return on
their reserves. lt is also co cordial
with general economic and
financial theory that assumes that
the richer an investor is, the less
risk averse he becomes.

(c)

PERFOMANc
MEASUREMENT
The trend among central banks

is clearly towards a

more

performance driven approach. This

process can be expected to
continue, supported by a new
generation of reserve managers
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with greater financial

and
computer expertise. At the same
time, the gradual introduction of
new techniques and instruments in
the management of reserves will
only be possible when the
appropriate control mechanisms
are in place.

The standard criterion for

g perf o rm a n ce is
generally the total rate of return,
although a number of central banks
continue to publish their reserves
on a more traditional book-cost
accounting approach. Whatever
method is adopted, it should be
born in mind that wealth
eva lu atin

maximization ranks only third
among the reasons for holding
reserves.
(d) THE USE OF BENCHMARKS
The use of benchmarks has

become the norm as regards
performance assessment of
reserve management. ln some
cases, an appropriate benchmark
is established only after lengthy
internal debate and is usually fixed
by an investment committee on the
basis of the policy guidelines set
by the board.

The benchmark serves as a
means of communication and
control across the whole
organization. lt expresses the risk
preferences and the goals of the
board; it reflects the long-term
investment policy of the
management; it represents the
market-neutral position and the
target to be met by the portfolio;
and f inally, it facilitates the
allocation of responsibilities and
the monitoring of exposure.
The selection of a Qenchmark
is where portfolio theory has a role

to play by obliging a central bank
not only to consider basic tradeoffs between risk and return but
also to evaluate the costs of the

constraints under which

it
operates. Through optimization
and simulation exercises, it is then

JULY/SEPTEMBER.

possible to enhance return without

unduly increasing risks.
(e) THE USE OF EXTERNAL FUND

MANAGERS

Some of the reasons given by
central banks for engaging external

portfolio managers to handle a
segment or more of their external
reserves are:
r Opportunity to invest indirectly
in certain markets where it would be
difficult to be active, either for time
zone reasons or due to lack of the
required expertise;
I Access to worldwide research
network supported by state of the
art technology, superior flow of
market information and analysis
which enhance investment decision
making;
f Benchmark to assess returns
generated from direct investment;
I Access to the resources of
major global financial institutions,
wealth of expertise, with full range
of financial services;
! Access to training facilities and
more importantly the opportunity to
profit from ongoing dialogue about
fund management with a firm that
is a major player in the market.
(0 THE USE OF DERTVATIVES
While many institutions remain
very cautious, other central banks
have increased their use of derivatives for reserve management pur-

poses, considering them much as
an additional tool to manage their
portfolio rather than'a specific asset class. At present central banks
are mostly using straightfonryard, linear products such as futures, for-

ward rate agreements, currency
and interest rate swaps. A limited
number of central banks have also
started to enter into options transactions and more recently there has

been a trend towards the use of
structured investment products.

The use of sophisticated

structured products has seen a
declining interest; this stems from
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the difficulty of building up the
systems and staff expertise
necessary to identify all the risks
involved. Nonetheless, derivatives
are becoming an area of growing
interest to central banks.
(0 TRADTNG lN GOLD
A significant proportion of the
reserves of some countries are
held in gold. Older economists and
economic historians will understand why this is the case, the
deep and complex former role of
gold in the world monetary system.
Although the market in gold is relatively illiquid when measured
against intervention scale transactions, a number of central banks
conduct regular gold sales while
others profit from the following
gold-based investment activities:
I Gold deposits, which are
similar to currency deposits, allow
central banks to earn interest on
their gold. lnterest is payable in
gold or in the currency mutually
agreed by the counterparties prior
to the booking of the transaction.
I Price protection without gold
shipments protects the value of
the gold reserves of a central bank
without making any shipments of
gold outside of the country of

ownership where the gold

is

domiciled. Here, the counterparty
sells put options to the central with
the right but not the obligation to
sell gold at pre-agreed price.
I Price protected gold deposits
allows a central bank to earn
interest on gold deposits while
protecting the value of its gold
reserves at current spot prices.
I Gold swap, which is similar to
currency swap, is used as a financing vehicle permitting a central
bank to reduce substantially the
cost of financing without having
the need to tap the international
debt markets.
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FACTORS LIKEL1 Y TO SLOW OR
REVERSE THE TRENDS

The emerging trends outlined
in particular the
increased emphasis on return
maximization, use of fund
managers, use of sophisticated

above and

instruments, trading in gold etc may
slow down in the coming years for
the following reasons:
ln the recent past, gold has not

I

represented

a very profitable

investment for central banks. The
yields available to those institutions
that lend their gold into the limited

deposit market have

been
relatively poor in comparison to
other high-grade investment
outlets. A large number of central
banks have found it impossible to
manage gold as a day-to-day

specialized and experienced
portfolio managers and their
general hiring policy aimed at
recruiting generalists. Moreover, as

salaries offered by private
institutions for premium talent.
Central banks can end up losing
staff to the private sector, which can

be very disruptive to the small
portfolio management teams of
central banks.
I The cost of infrastructures and
human resources that would be
incurred in keeping pace with the
market has tremendously increased
in recent times. lndeed, markets are
more efficient, technology has been
changing rapidly, and very large
players that can make very

asset.

substantial investments

The world economy is becoming increasingly more integrated as

technology dominate the markets.
It is difficult for central banks to

convertibility gains ground

make similar investments in
technology due to institutional
constraints, a lack of customers to
pass on the costs, less clear risk

I

in

emerging market economies. This
has been evidenced by an increase
in the capital flows between countries especially from industrialized
to emerging market economies. As
a result, any country, whether industrialized or developing, could
experience very large and sometimes abrupt capital inflows and outflows: in this case, every objective
or policy regarding reserve management is superseded by the
pressing demand for liquidity.
I Operating market activities in
public sector institutions such as

central banks poses specific
problems. Some of these are
related to the nature of decisionmaking process and human
resources management within
central banks. Other problems
arise due to some difficulties faced
by such institutions in making the
necessary investments required to
keep up with the rapid
development of financial markets.
f ln many central banks there
may be a conflict between their

specific needs for recruiting

sometimes prove as demanding
and time consuming as managing
the funds for themselves directly.

public institutions, central banks
cannot compete effectively with the

in

and return goals, and the instability
of foreign exchange reserves. For
this reason, central banks run the
risk that many mid-sized institutions

face, of falling behind in terms of
technology.

CONCLUSION

Reserve management has
continued to evolve broadly in
the areas of securitisation, return
maximization, use of derivates
and performance measurement.
Secondly, in response to the in-

creasing volatility of financial
variables, central banks have at
the same time continued to place
emphasis on liquidity constraints.
It is also pertinent to note that
the considerable emerg ing

trends in the management of
external reserves observed in
recent years could substantially
reverse its course. Head or tail,
managing reserves will never be
identical to private fund
management and will continue to
reflect for a large part the macroeconomic objectives and

constraints of

productive passive approach when
economic conditions are changing
abruptly.
Some structured products are
particularly complex and might not
meet central banks requirements of
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